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O que teria acontecido se Stalin não tivesse a ajuda das forças siberianas?

O que teria acontecido se Stalin não tivesse a ajuda das forças siberianas?


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Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, parte da razão pela qual a Alemanha foi paralisada (trocadilho) na frente russa foi devido ao fato de que Stalin foi capaz de mover todas as tropas siberianas que estavam defendendo a costa contra uma potencial invasão japonesa. Na verdade, 28 divisões foram transferidas do Leste da Rússia para defender a Rússia na Batalha de Moscou, já que Stalin sabia que o Japão não poderia se dar ao luxo de invadir a Rússia devido ao seu envolvimento total apenas com os EUA.

Minha pergunta: a Alemanha poderia ter derrotado os russos e ainda resistido à Frente Ocidental se o Japão tivesse mantido seu plano original de invadir a Rússia pelo leste e manter todas as suas tropas siberianas à distância?

Eles teriam sido capazes de conquistar Moscou e derrotar a Rússia se o Japão não tivesse se envolvido tanto na luta contra os Estados Unidos no Pacífico?


As forças do eixo pararam predominantemente antes de Moscou devido às temperaturas congelantes. Reforços russos foram usados ​​para contra-atacar e empurrá-los para trás (que, após ganhos surpreendentes, ruíram em uma derrota espetacular).

O Império Japonês não era uma ameaça significativa à União Soviética (apesar dos temores de Stalin). Vladivostok poderia ter sido levado, e isso teria algum significado, mas não mudaria o jogo.

O que foi significativo foi que a indústria russa havia sido puxada para trás dos Urais, tornando impossível a perspectiva de forças inimigas alcançá-la em 41/42.

Sem as forças siberianas, o cerco a Moscou provavelmente teria continuado no ano seguinte. Se os alemães poderiam envolver totalmente a cidade (muito menos captura) é outra coisa. Mesmo com a capital capturada, isso não significa necessariamente que a URSS teria caído (embora torne isso mais provável)


História dos alemães na Rússia, Ucrânia e União Soviética

o População de minoria alemã na Rússia, Ucrânia e União Soviética provém de várias fontes e chega em várias ondas. Uma estimativa de 1914 colocou o número de alemães que viviam no Império Russo em 2.416.290. [7] Em 1989, a União Soviética tinha uma população étnica alemã de aproximadamente 2 milhões. [8] Em 2002, após o colapso da União Soviética em 1991, muitos alemães étnicos emigraram e a população caiu pela metade para cerca de um milhão. 597.212 alemães se identificaram como tal no censo russo de 2002, tornando os alemães o quinto maior grupo étnico da Federação Russa. Havia 353.441 alemães no Cazaquistão e 21.472 no Quirguistão (1999) [9], enquanto 33.300 alemães viviam na Ucrânia (censo de 2001). [10]

No Império Russo antes do reinado (1762-1796) de Catarina, a Grande, os alemães étnicos eram fortemente representados entre a realeza e a aristocracia, pois a nobreza europeia era altamente inter-relacionada. [ citação necessária ] Além disso, os alemães se tornaram proeminentes entre grandes proprietários de terras, oficiais militares e os escalões superiores do serviço imperial, engenheiros, cientistas, artistas, médicos e a burguesia em geral, porque havia uma forte educação entre alguns dos alemães povos. [ citação necessária Os alemães da Rússia não falavam necessariamente russo, muitos falavam alemão, enquanto o francês era freqüentemente usado como a língua da alta aristocracia. Dependendo da geografia e de outras circunstâncias, muitos russo-alemães falavam russo como primeira ou segunda língua. Durante o século 19, muitos dos primeiros imigrantes começaram a se identificar principalmente como russos, principalmente durante e após as Guerras Napoleônicas de 1803-1815. O grande número de fazendeiros e comerciantes de vilas que chegaram após o convite de Catarina, a Grande, tiveram permissão para se estabelecer em vilas exclusivamente alemãs e manter sua língua, religião e cultura alemãs até a década de 1920. Ela estava tentando repovoar algumas áreas devastadas pela invasão otomana e por doenças.

Os russos-alemães de hoje falam principalmente russo, pois estão em processo gradual de assimilação. Como tal, muitos podem não ser necessariamente fluentes em alemão. Consequentemente, a Alemanha recentemente limitou estritamente seu repatriamento. O declínio no número de alemães na Federação Russa foi moderado, pois eles não estão mais emigrando para a Alemanha. Além disso, os alemães do Cazaquistão estão se mudando para a Rússia em vez da Alemanha. Como as condições para os alemães na Rússia geralmente se deterioraram no final do século 19 e início do século 20 durante o período de agitação e revolução, muitos alemães étnicos migraram da Rússia para as Américas e outros lugares. Eles se tornaram conhecidos coletivamente como alemães da Rússia.


Conteúdo

Vasily nasceu em 21 de março de 1921, filho de Joseph Stalin e Nadezhda Alliluyeva. Ele tinha um meio-irmão mais velho, Yakov Dzhugashvili (nascido em 1907), do primeiro casamento de seu pai com Kato Svanidze, e uma irmã mais nova, Svetlana, nasceu em 1926. [1] [2] A família também acolheu Artyom Sergeyev, o filho de Fyodor Sergeyev, um amigo próximo de Joseph. Fyodor morreu quatro meses após o nascimento de Artyom em um acidente, então o menino foi criado na casa de Stalin. [3]

Como sua mãe estava interessada em seguir uma carreira profissional, uma babá, Alexandra Bychokova, foi contratada para cuidar de Stalin e Svetlana. [4] Em 9 de novembro de 1932, a mãe de Stalin atirou em si mesma. [5] Para esconder o suicídio, as crianças foram informadas de que Alliluyeva morrera de peritonite, uma complicação da apendicite. Passariam-se 10 anos antes que soubessem a verdade sobre a morte da mãe. [6] Svetlana escreveria mais tarde que a morte de sua mãe teve um impacto profundo em seu irmão. Ela observou que ele começou a beber álcool aos 13 anos, e em episódios de embriaguez a amaldiçoava e atacava. [7] Ele também se tornou cada vez mais violento, especialmente em relação a Svetlana, e seria bastante perturbador em Zubalovo, uma dacha fora de Moscou que era sua residência principal. [8]

A partir da morte de Alliluyeva, Joseph Stalin deixou de visitar seus filhos, apenas a babá e chefe dos guardas de segurança de Stalin cuidavam de Vasily e sua irmã. Com seu pai frequentemente ausente, Stalin se aproximou de Károly Pauker, um húngaro que trabalhava como guarda-costas de seu pai. Pauker freqüentemente viajava para fora da União Soviética e trazia presentes para o jovem Stalin, embora durante o Grande Expurgo sua nacionalidade estrangeira e as excursões o tornassem um alvo de repressão, e ele foi baleado em agosto de 1937. [9] outros guardas também, e bebeu com eles. Mais tarde, ele refletiria que toda a sua vida foi "passada entre adultos, entre guardas" e que isso deixou "uma marca profunda em toda a [sua] vida privada e caráter". Ele tentou chamar a atenção de seu pai, escrevendo cartas sobre o que estava fazendo, mas o Stalin mais velho não retribuiu. [11]

Em 1933, Stalin e sua irmã foram matriculados na Escola Modelo de Moscou nº 25, uma escola pública de destaque. [12] Stalin era um aluno pobre, e Svetlana se lembrava de que os professores frequentemente discutiam seu mau comportamento com seu pai. [13] Ele foi transferido da escola em 1937 para a Escola Especial nº 2, embora o corpo docente não fizesse nada para restringir seu comportamento. Um ano depois, Stalin, agora com 17 anos, foi enviado para a Escola de Aviação Militar de Kachinsk. [14] Ele inicialmente queria frequentar uma escola de artilharia, mas como seu meio-irmão Yakov já estava matriculado em uma, seu pai não queria os dois no mesmo ramo militar. [15] Seu pai ordenou que a escola não lhe concedesse nenhum favor ou devido ao seu nome, e pediu que ele ficasse em um quartel regular. Stalin se saiu muito bem na escola, com um relatório de 1939 para seu pai observando que ele era "[des] dedicado à causa do Partido de Lenin-Stalin" e estava "interessado e versado em questões da situação internacional e doméstica " No entanto, o relatório também observou que Stalin tendia a estudar mal, não fazia a barba para o serviço e reagiu "mal à confusão durante o voo". [16] Ele completou seus estudos em março de 1940, com suas notas finais afirmando que foi "excelente" e recebeu o posto de tenente da Força Aérea. [17] Em 31 de dezembro de 1940, ele se casou com Galina Burdonskaya, uma estudante da Universidade Estadual de Artes Gráficas de Moscou, e também tinha 19 anos. [17] [18]

A União Soviética foi invadida pela Alemanha nazista em 22 de junho de 1941, e Stalin foi transferido para a frente em agosto de 1941 e recebeu o sobrenome Ivanov em uma tentativa de ocultar sua identidade. Como filho de Stalin, raramente voava em combate e, quando o fazia, era acompanhado por uma formação. No total, Vasily participou de 29 missões de combate e diz-se que abateu duas aeronaves inimigas. [19] Como filho do líder soviético, Vasily era odiado pela maioria de seus colegas, que o consideravam um informante de seu pai. [20] Na primavera de 1942, ele foi enviado de volta a Moscou, com a missão de inspecionar as condições da Força Aérea, e principalmente ficou em Moscou pelo resto da guerra. [19] Entediado neste papel, Vasily se encontrou em apuros depois de um incidente de 4 de abril de 1943, onde explodiu no rio Moskva, ferindo-se e matando o engenheiro de vôo. [21]

Como resultado da explosão, Vasily foi rebaixado, embora em um ano e meio tenha sido promovido a comandar uma divisão aérea. Ele foi promovido a general e, aos 24 anos, foi nomeado o general mais jovem do Exército Vermelho. Ele também recebeu várias condecorações, incluindo a Ordem da Bandeira Vermelha (duas vezes), a Ordem de Alexandre Nevsky e a Ordem de Suvorov. Após a guerra, ele foi transferido para a Alemanha como parte da ocupação soviética. [22]

Ele foi promovido a major-general em 1946, a tenente-general em 1947 e comandante das Forças Aéreas do Distrito Militar de Moscou em 1948.

Após a guerra, Vasily começou a se interessar por esportes, em particular hóquei no gelo. Ele ajudou a desenvolver uma equipe para representar a força aérea, VVS Moscou, e trouxe Anatoly Tarasov como o jogador-treinador para a temporada inaugural em 1946-1947. No entanto, Tarasov discutiu com Vasily sobre os jogadores e deixou o time após uma temporada pelo CDKA Moscou (mais tarde CSKA Moscou). [23] Em 5 de janeiro de 1950, um avião que transportava a equipe VVS caiu em Sverdlovsk, matando a equipe. [24] Mesmo assim, VVS ganhou três títulos consecutivos da Liga do Campeonato Soviético de 1951 a 1953, antes que Vasily se desfizesse do time após a morte de seu pai. [25]

Joseph Stalin morreu em 5 de março de 1953. Vasily chegou logo após a morte de seu pai e, em uma fúria de bêbado, afirmou que seu pai havia sido envenenado. [26] Após a morte de seu pai, um longo período de problemas começou para Vasily. O Ministério da Defesa se ofereceu para permitir que ele assumisse o comando de qualquer distrito militar, mas não de Moscou, que era tudo o que ele aceitaria. Isso não foi possível, então, em vez disso, Vasily foi forçado a se aposentar do exército. [27] Menos de dois meses após a morte de seu pai, Vasily foi preso em 28 de abril de 1953, porque havia visitado um restaurante com diplomatas estrangeiros. Ele foi acusado de denegrir os líderes da União Soviética, propaganda anti-soviética e negligência criminosa, e condenado a oito anos de prisão. [28] O julgamento foi conduzido em privado e ele foi negado a representação legal de seu apelo aos novos líderes soviéticos, Nikita Khrushchev e Georgy Malenkov, por clemência sem sucesso. Ele foi preso na penitenciária especial de Vladimir com o nome de "Vasily Pavlovich Vasilyev". Ele foi libertado da prisão em 11 de janeiro de 1960. O Comitê Central do Partido Comunista da União Soviética concedeu-lhe uma pensão de 300 rublos, um apartamento em Moscou e um tratamento de férias de três meses em Kislovodsk. Ele também recebeu permissão para usar seu uniforme de general e todas as suas medalhas militares. [ verificação necessária ]

Stalin morreu em 19 de março de 1962, devido ao alcoolismo crônico, dois dias antes de seu 41º aniversário, [29] e foi enterrado no cemitério de Arskoe. [30]

Stalin foi parcialmente reabilitado em 1999, quando o Colégio Militar da Suprema Corte suspendeu as acusações de propaganda anti-soviética que datavam de 1953. Seu corpo foi enterrado novamente ao lado de sua quarta esposa em um cemitério de Moscou em 2002. [30]


A batalha por Moscou: como a Rússia impediu as forças armadas de Hitler e # 039 durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial

Em outubro de 1941, a Segunda Guerra Mundial oscilou no fio da navalha.

Houve guerra na China e guerra no Norte da África, e logo haveria guerra entre a América e o Japão. Mas no outono de 1941, a única guerra que realmente parecia importar foi travada em uma parte da Rússia central.

A Operação Barbarossa, a invasão alemã da União Soviética, começou brilhantemente em 22 de junho de 1941. Cerco após cerco infligiu quase 4 milhões de baixas aos enormes mas desorganizados exércitos soviéticos. No início de outubro, eles avançaram para dentro de 200 milhas de Moscou. Agora vinha a Operação Tufão, a ofensiva para tomar a capital soviética e - ou assim os alemães esperavam - encerrar a campanha.

O desespero gera otimismo, então, de fato, a Alemanha precisava acabar logo com a guerra no Leste. Os cinejornais de vastas colunas de prisioneiros soviéticos perplexos podem ter transmitido uma imagem da invencibilidade alemã, mas para a Wehrmacht, a Rússia era a morte por mil cortes. A Alemanha e seus aliados comprometeram mais de 3 milhões de homens para Barbarossa: em outubro, eles sofreram mais de 500.000 baixas, ou 15% da força de invasão. Os panzers que varreram 500 milhas de profundidade na Rússia deixaram um rastro de tanques quebrados. As estradas russas, poucas em número e de baixa qualidade, devoraram talvez 40% da frota de caminhões alemã. Isso deixou as ferrovias como artérias de abastecimento na Frente Oriental, mas os trilhos da ferrovia russa eram mais largos do que os alemães, prendendo trens de abastecimento que não podiam seguir em frente até que as equipes de reparo modificassem os trilhos russos. A logística alemã entrou em colapso, deixando as tropas sem comida, munição e principalmente combustível para os blindados.

Não que os soviéticos estivessem em melhor forma. Com seu corpo de oficiais dizimado antes da guerra, e seus generais muitas vezes incompetentes, mas politicamente aceitáveis ​​bajuladores, o Exército Vermelho foi pego de surpresa e então implacavelmente espancado por um oponente que conquistou a França em apenas seis semanas. Mas pelo menos os soviéticos estavam recuando em suas bases de abastecimento. O Exército Vermelho também foi infundido com um fluxo interminável de novas divisões após novas divisões. As tropas eram mal treinadas e comandadas com certeza, mas a inteligência alemã, convencida de que os soviéticos já deveriam ter entrado em colapso, não conseguia entender como o Exército Vermelho poderia suportar tamanha investida e ainda assim continuar crescendo.

A Operação Typhoon foi como uma luta de boxe entre dois lutadores maltratados e ensanguentados que mal se erguiam. Os soviéticos poderiam colocar mais de um milhão de soldados e mil tanques em Moscou, escavados em várias linhas defensivas cavadas por mulheres e crianças. Os alemães conseguiram reunir quase dois milhões de homens e mais de mil tanques e quinhentas aeronaves. O plano era fazer mais do que já funcionava tão bem: conduzir uma série de operações de pinça para cercar e destruir os exércitos soviéticos na frente de Moscou e, em seguida, avançar para a capital. Os panzers de movimento rápido seriam os braços das pinças, circundando o inimigo para impedi-lo de escapar até que a infantaria alemã, que se movimentava com os pés, alcançasse a armadura e enxugasse o bolso. Quando a Wehrmacht chegasse a Moscou, a cidade também seria cercada e capturada.

Com abastecimento adequado e bom tempo, uma força de ataque alemã tão grande provavelmente poderia ter conquistado qualquer país do planeta. Infelizmente, nenhuma das condições seria verdadeira. A fase inicial do Typhoon ocorreu de acordo com o planejado, com quatro exércitos soviéticos e mais de 500.000 soldados soviéticos mortos ou capturados apenas em Vyazma.

Mas então a chuva e a neve derretida caíram no início de outubro, trazendo com eles o infame Rasputitsa, a estação lamacenta que transformou a paisagem russa em tal atoleiro que os veículos afundaram até os eixos. Eles tiveram que ser puxados por equipes de soldados suados, cujas botas também desapareceram no pântano glutinoso. Não apenas as tropas de combate não conseguiam avançar, mas também os caminhões de suprimentos também não podiam. Enquanto isso, contra-ataque soviético após contra-ataque soviético, mesmo que repelido, deixou as forças alemãs abatidas e exauridas.

Também desagradáveis ​​foram os tanques soviéticos T-34. Mais fortemente armados e blindados do que seus equivalentes teutônicos, os alemães engasgaram de consternação quando suas armas antitanques ricochetearam no couro grosso do T-34. Para piorar a situação, o T-34 tinha pistas largas, o que lhe dava melhor manobrabilidade na lama.

Mas a Wehrmacht ainda retinha a habilidade, liderança e profissionalismo que a tornavam o melhor exército do mundo na época. O avanço continuou, levando Stalin a ordenar a evacuação do governo soviético de Moscou para Kuibyshev. Apesar de Stalin ter optado por permanecer na capital, a mudança enfraqueceu ainda mais o moral soviético.

Depois que os exércitos alemães pararam para respirar no início de novembro, o tempo ficou mais frio, congelando a lama e dando às tropas de Hitler a base sólida de que precisavam para avançar. No final de novembro, as unidades de reconhecimento alemãs estavam a apenas 19 quilômetros de Moscou, tão perto que podiam ver as torres da cidade com seus binóculos.

Tão perto e tão longe. No início de dezembro, o termômetro havia caído para 45 graus abaixo de zero Fahrenheit. Não é verdade que os alemães desconheciam o inverno russo. Mas com capacidade de abastecimento limitada, a prioridade foi dada ao combustível e munições. Além disso, quem precisa de roupas de inverno se Moscou deveria ser capturada antes da chegada do General Winter?

Em vez disso, foram os soviéticos que atacaram. Stalin havia recebido informações de Richard Sorge, um alemão que vivia no Japão, mas trabalhava para a inteligência soviética, de que os japoneses se voltariam para o sul para lutar contra os americanos e britânicos, em vez de para o norte, contra a Sibéria. Ele se sentiu capaz de transferir 18 divisões de elite da Sibéria, bem treinadas e equipadas para operar em condições rigorosas de inverno, de trem para Moscou.

Quando a contra-ofensiva começou em 5 de dezembro, os exércitos soviéticos perfuraram um inimigo mais espantalho do que humano. Armas alemãs foram congeladas, soldados alemães foram congelados e às vezes os soldados congelaram para as armas. Os sobreviventes só puderam assistir, impotentes, enquanto os atacantes, calorosamente vestidos com jaquetas e botas forradas de pele e camuflados com roupas de neve brancas, emergiam como fantasmas através da névoa e da neve.

Agora veio um daqueles pontos de decisão que ocorrem em todas as grandes batalhas. Alguns generais de Hitler queriam recuar para uma linha distante de Moscou. Mas Hitler temia que uma retirada se desintegrasse em uma debandada de pânico que levaria o Exército Vermelho aos portões da Alemanha. Ele ordenou que suas tropas mantivessem suas posições até o último homem, uma defesa de ouriço de pontos fortes que seriam defendidos mesmo quando cercados. Embora Hitler tenha despedido alguns generais que discordaram, muitos comandantes alemães posteriormente elogiaram a decisão por evitar um colapso como o sofrido pelo Grande Armée de Napoleão em 1812.

Os alemães foram empurrados de volta para Rzhev, a 150 milhas de Moscou. Mas suas linhas ainda estavam intactas e, embora danificados, seus exércitos ainda estavam prontos para lutar. E agora foi a vez de Stalin ter excesso de confiança. Os soviéticos também sofreram gravemente durante a contra-ofensiva: suas tropas eram inexperientes, suas linhas de abastecimento estavam sobrecarregadas pela neve e lama e eles também sofreram com o frio. Mesmo assim, com o sonho de chegar a Berlim, Stalin ordenou que suas forças exaustos continuassem atacando. O resultado foram pesadas perdas em ataques inúteis. Em fevereiro, os alemães chegaram a contra-atacar, destruindo várias divisões soviéticas.

O que foi realizado? Ambos os lados apostaram e fracassaram. Os sonhos alemães de capturar Moscou e encerrar a guerra no Leste haviam evaporado. Os sonhos de Stalin de uma grande contra-ofensiva que expulsaria os alemães da União Soviética também vacilaram. O matadouro que era a Frente Oriental continuaria em 1942 e depois em 1945.

No entanto, foi a aposta de Hitler que se revelou fatal. 1941 e 1942 seriam os últimos anos em que os alemães teriam o luxo de travar uma guerra em uma só frente. Depois disso, os americanos e britânicos abririam as segundas frentes com pousos anfíbios na Europa e bombardeios ininterruptos sobre o Terceiro Reich. Se Hitler queria vencer, tinha que ser antes que os anglo-americanos reunissem sua força e antes que os soviéticos reorganizassem seus exércitos e explorassem seu vasto potencial industrial.

Ironicamente, a catástrofe que a Alemanha mal evitou em Moscou só levou a catástrofes mais tarde. Hitler pode ter estado certo ao ordenar que seus exércitos não recuassem. Para o ex-cabo, ressentido e desconfiado do corpo de oficiais alemão, isso era prova de que ele possuía mais gênio e coragem do que os soldados profissionais. Portanto, Hitler só ouviria a si mesmo e nunca aceitaria o conselho de seus generais de recuar, o que significava que os exércitos alemães em Stalingrado e na Normandia mantiveram suas posições até serem destruídos.

A captura de Moscou teria alterado o resultado da Segunda Guerra Mundial? A perda de sua capital muitas vezes leva as nações a buscarem a paz. Moscou era mais do que a capital administrativa da União Soviética: era também um centro ferroviário e de produção vital. Havia também o valor simbólico: ditadores totalitários, como Hitler e Stalin, construíam imagens de si mesmos como líderes oniscientes de suas nações. Perder Moscou certamente teria abalado a confiança popular em Stalin. Na verdade, Stalin aparentemente lançou discretas sondagens de paz para a Alemanha por meio da Suécia, que Hitler ignorou.


Fiquei surpreso ao saber que Stalin se destacou como líder como ladrão de banco. Conte-nos sobre isso - e como sua juventude moldou sua carreira política.

[Risos] Ele realmente começou a se tornar um padre! Sua mãe o mandou para a igreja da divindade ortodoxa grega até os 16 anos, mas ele foi expulso por ler literatura imprópria, o que provavelmente era algum tipo de propaganda comunista. Depois disso, ele se tornou um marxista-leninista. Ele fez carreira arrecadando dinheiro para os marxistas da única maneira que conhecia, que era roubando. Eles estavam em roubo de banco e extorsão e todos os tipos de atividades assim. Ele fez isso até a Revolução Russa, 10 anos depois, quando se tornou membro do partido e tinha um emprego mais legítimo. Ele era um homem muito brutal, que seguia a doutrina de que os fins justificam os meios. Ele foi citado como tendo dito algo no sentido de que, a morte de um homem foi uma tragédia a morte de um milhão de homens é uma estatística.


Por que os sonhos de Stalin e # 039s de uma marinha soviética de navios de guerra nunca se tornaram realidade

Ponto chave: Após a destruição da Segunda Guerra Mundial, Moscou não tinha recursos suficientes para construir dezenas e dezenas de navios de guerra, não importa o quanto Stalin os desejasse.

No final da Segunda Guerra Mundial, o ditador soviético Josef Stalin permaneceu indiscutivelmente o homem mais poderoso da Eurásia. Seu Exército Vermelho esmagou a Alemanha nazista, repelindo uma invasão e conquistando Berlim após uma campanha exaustiva de quatro anos. O Exército Vermelho de Stalin era indiscutivelmente mais poderoso do que os exércitos americano, britânico, francês e europeu ocidental juntos.

Ainda assim, isso não foi suficiente.

Stalin tinha muito ansiava por uma marinha forte isso estenderia a influência soviética para longe da Europa e da Ásia, e o faria em grande escala.

O líder soviético queria navios de guerra, e muitos deles.

Uma frota que simplesmente não existia, existia em grande parte no papel e até incluía alguns navios altamente avançados que eram pura farsa.

Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, a Marinha Soviética era um distante terceiro lugar nas prioridades. Foi o Exército Vermelho que travou as árduas batalhas terrestres e as campanhas que derrotaram a Alemanha. Apoiando-o estava uma Força Aérea Vermelha otimizada, como a Luftwaffe, no apoio tático das forças terrestres no campo de batalha. A Marinha, por outro lado, desempenhou um papel muito limitado, fornecendo proteção de comboio para equipamentos de Lend-Lease dos EUA e apoio para operações terrestres e assédio aos militares alemães nas regiões do Báltico e do Mar Negro.

Ainda assim, em meados de 1945 estava claro para Stalin que, com a saída da Alemanha, seus rivais mais poderosos - os Estados Unidos e o Reino Unido - estavam do outro lado da água e fora do alcance de seus exércitos. O mesmo acontecia com o Japão, que a URSS fora impedida de ocupar, e muitas das ex-colônias europeias que estavam prontas para a revolução. Exército poderoso ou não, se Stalin queria permanecer uma grande potência militar, ele precisaria de uma marinha poderosa.

Por que navios de guerra ?:

No final da Segunda Guerra Mundial, estava claro que os navios de guerra estavam obsoletos. Porta-aviões os substituíram como plataforma naval dominante, fato dolorosamente claro para o Império do Japão durante literalmente dezenas de batalhas marítimas no Teatro de Operações do Pacífico. Após a guerra, os aliados ocidentais se desfizeram principalmente dos navios de guerra, preservando suas frotas de porta-aviões.

Apesar de seu sucesso, Stalin não gostava de porta-aviões e preferia navios de guerra. Em um Reunião de setembro de 1945 da liderança soviética, Stalin rejeitou uma proposta de construção de porta-aviões e, em vez disso, ordenou que a Marinha soviética concluísse a construção do encouraçado Sovetskaya Rossiya. O navio de guerra foi derrubado em 1940 e ainda estava com menos de um por cento completo no final da guerra. Ele também instruiu a Marinha a construir dois navios de guerra “Projeto 24” de 75.000 toneladas e sete cruzadores de batalha “Projeto 82” (classe Stalingrado), deslocando 36.500 toneladas e equipados com nove canhões de doze polegadas. Stalin aprovou apenas dois porta-aviões leves, um número inútil considerando a superioridade das frotas americana e britânica.

O plano estava fadado ao fracasso. A União Soviética nunca teve grande capacidade de construção de navios, e o desenvolvimento dessa capacidade foi adiado pela Grande Guerra Patriótica. Além disso, a guerra havia causado grandes danos à capacidade industrial do país, que precisava ser substituída. Havia tantos recursos disponíveis e, gradualmente, a União Soviética reduziu os planos de uma grande frota de superfície. Os 75.000 navios de guerra nunca foram construídos e apenas dois dos sete cruzadores de batalha começaram a construção - nenhum foi realmente concluído. A morte de Stalin em 1953 acabou com o sonho de uma grande frota de navios de guerra.

Enquanto isso, relatos de uma nova classe de supercouraçados soviéticos se infiltravam no Ocidente. Vários periódicos, incluindo os supostos navios de combate de Jane, espalharam o boato de sete novos super-navios de guerra, apelidados de K-1000, em construção em estaleiros siberianos.

Os sete supernavios: Strana Sovetov, Sovetskaya Byelorossia, Krasnaya Bessarabiya, Krasnaya Sibir, Sovietskaya Konstitutsia, Lenin e Sovetskiy Soyuz foram considerados entre 36.000 e 55.000 toneladas - ironicamente menores do que os navios que Stalin realmente aprovou. Eles foram relatados de várias maneiras como tendo uma velocidade máxima entre 25 e 33 nós e carregavam uma bateria de nove a doze canhões de 16 polegadas e doze canhões de 18 polegadas. Eles também deveriam ter mísseis teleguiados como armamento.

O problema: eles eram uma farsa. O boato se espalhou na imprensa ocidental, mas a União Soviética, assim que soube deles, encorajou os boatos. Alguns dos nomes eram recauchutados da classe Sovetsky Soyuz cancelada anteriormente. Os navios eram plausíveis o suficiente para soar reais, embora a União Soviética não tivesse desenvolvido mísseis guiados capazes de serem instalados em navios. Os rumores eram vantajosos para Moscou - se os países da OTAN acreditavam que uma frota de supercouraçados estava a caminho, eles teriam que descobrir um meio de derrotá-los, drenando recursos das forças terrestres que protegiam a Europa Ocidental.

Como poder predominantemente terrestre, a União Soviética estava destinada a gastar a maior parte de seus recursos nas forças terrestres. O poder marítimo por necessidade ficou em terceiro lugar. Enquanto a URSS conseguiu colocar em campo quatro cruzadores de batalha da classe Kirov na década de 1980, nunca chegou perto de perceber a grande frota vermelha de Stalin.

Kyle Mizokami é um escritor de defesa e segurança nacional baseado em San Francisco que apareceu nos jornais Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring e Daily Beast. Em 2009, ele foi cofundador do blog de defesa e segurança Japan Security Watch. Você pode segui-lo no Twitter: @KyleMizokami. Este apareceu pela primeira vez no ano passado e está sendo publicado devido ao interesse do leitor.


Por que Stalin matou os kulaks

Os kulaks eram pequenos fazendeiros burgueses, mais ricos do que os camponeses comuns porque tinham contratado mão de obra, possuíam uma usina, fábrica de laticínios ou outro tipo de instalação de processamento, alugavam máquinas ou equipamentos agrícolas regularmente e dependiam de formas de renda não trabalhistas, tais como empréstimos comerciais, empréstimos diretos, etc. Um kulak era alguém que se engajou em pelo menos uma das atividades acima.

Os kulaks eram um grupo altamente resistente de capitalistas pequeno-burgueses.

Ilustração das três grandes categorias de camponeses, maio de 1926

Os kulaks resistiram ao governo desde o início. Eles foram fundamentais para resistir a todas as tentativas de Lenin e dos bolcheviques de eliminar a extrema desigualdade que dominava os camponeses. Como tal, eram considerados inimigos de classe.

A fome era uma parte normal da vida russa, remontando a centenas de anos. Lenin acabou fazendo uma difícil paz com os kulaks, permitindo a propriedade de algumas propriedades privadas e forças de mercado com sua NEP. Isso foi feito porque a guerra com os brancos (czaristas, kulaks, direitistas, exércitos estrangeiros e kulaks) causou outra fome. Esforços de ajuda internacional foram introduzidos para aliviar a fome. Eles destruíram as linhas ferroviárias e o movimento de suprimentos de emergência foi prejudicado. A NEP deveria ser temporária até que a nação pudesse se reconstruir.

Stalin previu que os alemães invadiriam novamente por causa dos termos injustos do acordo da Primeira Guerra Mundial. A economia alemã foi destruída pela demanda por reparações. A Alemanha tinha uma longa história de agressão. A única maneira de se preparar para o eventual ataque era fazer com que as pessoas se mudassem para as cidades para se industrializarem. Isso criaria armas, tanques, aviões e outras armas. Mas a história da fome impediu que isso acontecesse. O plano de Stalin era coletivizar a agricultura e introduzir métodos agrícolas modernos para aumentar a produtividade. Até que isso acontecesse, a agricultura era feita com gado e arados de madeira. Novamente, a fome era uma ocorrência regular, inclusive durante o Império Russo.

Os kulaks resistiram à coletivização desde o início. Eles incentivaram os camponeses a crescer 30% menos porque o governo pretendia requisitar essa quantia para alimentar os que moram nas cidades. Após o anúncio da coletivização, eles se levantaram e mataram várias famílias soviéticas e abateram metade do gado necessário para o cultivo da comida. Muitos sabotaram as próprias safras. Um problema maior era acumular grãos para especular sobre os preços das requisições. Isso foi feito apesar do fato de que as pessoas morreriam de fome. A mentalidade dos kulaks era essencialmente capitalista, e preocupar-se com os outros não era problema deles.

These collectivization farmers are praising the collectives and asking for the elimination of the kulaks as a class.

The Holomodor was a famine caused by drought, a higher birth rate prior to the famine, sabotage from kulaks and the intentional hiding of grain, resulting crop failure. The famine occurred not just in Ukraine, but other areas as well. Goebbels and Hearst fabricated a story that Stalin caused the famine and intentionally starved millions of people. This is against the facts. Hearst was a pro-Nazi newspaper publisher close to Goebbels. A fake news story about the famine being intentional was created and published. Old photos from the famine in 1917 were used. The idea was to stir up Ukrainian nationalism ahead of a German invasion. Goebbels was big on these types of psy-ops. Further, there is documented proof that Stalin ordered relief measures to Ukraine. Independent journalists also visited and confirmed that the famine was unintentional.

In this photo Soviet workers find grain hidden by kulaks.

These kulaks protest, refusing to share their grain

Before collectivization farming plots were small.

Collectivization updated farming methods

The U.S. refused to accept gold for payment of industrial equipment. It imposed sanctions on the USSR in hopes of starving the people into revolt. It would only accept grain for payment, which exacerbated the Ukrainian famine.

There was a dispute between the members of the government and Stalin about how to deal with the kulaks. Some members wanted to bring the kulaks into the collectivization efforts. But given their history of sabotage, violence, and resistance, Stalin didn’t want to bring them in. Instead, he proposed that they be relocated away from the Ukraine, as the risk of another famine was too high. This process was called dekulakkization. Kulaks that violently refused requisition of grain were met with similar violence.

The collectivization was successful. After the Ukrainian famine, there were no subsequent famines. In fact, the average Russian had a diet that was more nutritious and had more calories available than the average American.

Sadly, the conflicts with the kulaks has been politicized to vilify Stalin and the Soviets. The reality was much more nuanced than “Stalin killed and starved 20 million Ukrainians and kulaks.” In the modern day Ukrainian nationalists have been trying to get the Holomodor listed as a genocide because then the Ukraine could get reparations via the U.N. from Russia. It also serves as a useful victim card to play for political purposes. Interestingly, the Ukrainians received the same relief measures as others, including neighboring areas that were affected.

“It is a matter of some significance that Cardinal Innitzer’s allegations of famine-genocide were widely promoted throughout the 1930s, not only by Hitler’s chief propagandist Goebbels, but also by American Fascists as well.

It will be recalled that Hearst kicked off his famine campaign with a radio broadcast based mainly on material from Cardinal Innitzer’s “aid committee.” In Organized Anti-Semitism in America, the 1941 book exposing Nazi groups and activities in the pre-war United States, Donald Strong notes that American fascist leader Father Coughlin used Nazi propaganda material extensively. This included Nazi charges of “atrocities by Jew Communists” and verbatim portions of a Goebbels speech referring to Innitzer’s “appeal of July 1934, that millions of people were dying of hunger throughout the Soviet Union.”

Tottle, Douglas. Fraud, Famine, and Fascism. Toronto: Progress Books,1987, p. 49–51″

“This is Stalin urging the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to take appropriate measures to prevent a crop failure.

The Political Bureau believes that shortage of seed grain in Ukraine is many times worse than what was described in comrade Kosior’s telegram therefore, the Political Bureau recommends the Central Committee of the Communist party of Ukraine to take all measures within its reach to prevent the threat of failing to sow [field crops] in Ukraine.
Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee — J. STALIN

From the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. Fond 3, Record Series 40, File 80, Page 58.

Excerpt from the protocol number of the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks) “Regarding Measures to Prevent Failure to Sow in Ukraine, March 16th, 1932.”

“This is the response of Anna Louise Strong, an American journalist famous for reporting on the Soviet Union, to a question about the supposed genocide.

QUESTION: Is it true that during 1932–33 several million people were allowed to starve to death in the Ukraine and North Caucasus because they were politically hostile to the Soviets?

ANSWER: Not true. I visited several places in those regions during that period. There was a serious grain shortage in the 1932 harvest due chiefly to inefficiencies of the organizational period of the new large-scale mechanized farming among peasants unaccustomed to machines. To this was added sabotage by dispossessed kulaks, the leaving of the farms by 11 million workers who went to new industries, the cumulative effect of the world crisis in depressing the value of Soviet farm exports, and a drought in five basic grain regions in 1931.

The harvest of 1932 was better than that of 1931 but was not all gathered on account of overoptimistic promises from rural districts, Moscow discovered the actual situation only in December when a considerable amount of grain was under snow.

Strong, Anna Louise. Searching Out the Soviets. New Republic: August 7, 1935, p. 356

Here is Strong again on the harvest of 1933.

The conquest of bread was achieved that summer, a victory snatched from a great disaster. The 1933 harvest surpassed that of 1930, which till then had held the record. This time, the new record was made not by a burst of half-organized enthusiasm, but by growing efficiency and permanent organization … This nationwide cooperation beat the 1934 drought, securing a total crop for the USSR equal to the all-time high of 1933.

Strong, Anna Louise. The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 44–45

This is what a study of the Russian Archives led to.

Recent evidence has indicated that part of the cause of the famine was an exceptionally low harvest in 1932, much lower than incorrect Soviet methods of calculation had suggested. The documents included here or published elsewhere do not yet support the claim that the famine was deliberately produced by confiscating the harvest, or that it was directed especially against the peasants of the Ukraine.

Koenker and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives. Washington: Library of Congress, 1997, p. 401

Another confirmation after a search of the Russian archives.

In view of the importance of grain stocks to understanding the famine, we have searched Russian archives for evidence of Soviet planned and actual grain stocks in the early 1930s. Our main sources were the Politburo protocols, including the (“special files,” the highest secrecy level), and the papers of the agricultural collections committee Komzag, of the committee on commodity funds, and of Sovnarkom. The Sovnarkom records include telegrams and correspondence of Kuibyshev, who was head of Gosplan, head of Komzag and the committee on reserves, and one of the deputy chairs of Komzag at that time.

We have not obtained access to the Politburo working papers in the Presidential Archive, to the files of the committee on reserves or to the relevant files in military archives. But we have found enough information to be confident that this very a high figure for grain stocks is wrong and that Stalin did not have under his control huge amounts of grain, which could easily have been used to eliminate the famine.

Stalin, Grain Stocks and the Famine of 1932–1933 by R. W. Davies, M. B. Tauger, S.G. Wheatcroft.Slavic Review, Volume 54, Issue 3 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 642–657.”

This newspaper was published by Hearst as part of his deal with Goebbels to promote the Nazis. Hearst was also a Nazi supporter. The photos were found to be from other famines, one of them 10 years earlier. The “reporting” was fabrication. Other reporters that actually looked into it report that while there was a famine it was not intentional.


The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941 – review

S eventy-five years ago, on 23 August 1939, Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia stunned the world by announcing that they had concluded a non-aggression pact, committing themselves not to aid each other's enemies or to engage in hostile acts against one another. Stalin knew the pact would not be popular. "For many years now," he said, "we have been pouring buckets of shit on each other's heads, and our propaganda boys could not do enough in that direction. And now, all of a sudden, are we to make our peoples believe that all is forgotten and forgiven? Things don't work that fast." Many western European communists, disgusted at this turn of events, left the party at this point in what was probably the largest exodus of members before the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. The front garden of Nazi party headquarters in Munich was quickly filled with party badges and insignia thrown there by party members appalled at the thought of an alliance with the communist enemy they had spent their lives fighting against.

The shock would have been all the greater had people been aware of the secret clauses of the pact, with subsequent addenda, in which the two states agreed to partition Poland between them – Germany taking the larger part – while Hitler conceded that the independent Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, Finland and parts of Romania would fall into the Soviet sphere of influence. Just over a week later, Hitler invaded Poland, his armies brushing aside the brave but ill-equipped Polish army, while shortly afterwards the Red Army marched into the eastern part of the country. In 1940, Stalin's troops marched into the Baltic states. His attack on Finland was initially repulsed in the "Winter War", but numbers told in the end, and an uneasy peace was reached, marked by Soviet annexations of Finnish territory in the east of the country. Further south, the Soviets seized Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from the Romanians.

These events are hardly "largely unknown", as Roger Moorhouse claims in his new book, nor are they "dismissed as a dubious anomaly" in the standard histories of the second world war. They were a crucial feature of the runup to the outbreak of the war, and they entered literature as part of George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, where a sudden switch of alliances causes the hero Winston Smith to work overtime as he carries out the task assigned to him of rewriting the newspapers to make it look as if the new alliance had always been in existence.

And alliance indeed it was. For Hitler, the pact provided a guarantee that he could invade first Poland, then France and most of the rest of western Europe, without having to worry about any threat from the east. For Stalin, it allowed a breathing space in which to build up armed forces that had been severely damaged by the purges of the previous years, as his botched invasion of Finland showed. It also gave him the chance to expand the Soviet Union to include parts of the old Russian empire of pre-revolutionary times. Moorhouse is right, therefore, to insist that for Stalin the pact was not merely defensive, though he goes too far when he claims it was a golden opportunity for the Soviet leader "to set the world-historical forces" of revolution in motion. After a decade of "socialism in one country", he was not going to do that.

The pact eventually extended to the economic sphere, with Germany providing military equipment in exchange for raw materials such as oil, grain, iron and phosphates. Moorhouse sensibly discounts claims that these made a decisive economic difference to Germany or provided the Soviet Union with a crucial military advantage, though the statistics he quotes of German arms and equipment reaching Soviet factories are impressive, and Soviet deliveries of oil to the fuel-starved Germans were not without their effect. Shockingly, Stalin also handed back a substantial number of German communists who had taken refuge in the Soviet Union after the Nazi seizure of power some of them, arrested during the purges, were taken directly from the Soviet Gulag to a German concentration camp.

Moorhouse tells a good story and, though it has been told before, notably in Anthony Read and David Fisher's The Deadly Embrace (1988), he is able to add interesting new details. His account of the negotiation and signing of the pact, finalised by Ribbentrop and Molotov, two men who had become foreign ministers of their respective countries through fawning sycophancy towards their respective leaders, is masterly.

Yet for all its virtues this is a deeply problematic book. Page after page is devoted to a detailed description of the horrors inflicted by Stalin and his minions on the territories the pact allowed him to occupy, with mass arrests and deportatations, shootings, torture and expropriation. The shooting of thousands of Polish army officers by the Soviet secret police in Katyn Forest and elsewhere has been well known for decades, like the brutal deportation of over a million Poles to Siberia and Central Asia, but much of the material provided by Moorhouse on the Baltic states is relatively new and makes sobering reading.

None of this, however, is balanced by any comparable treatment of the atrocities committed by the Nazis in Poland following their occupation of the western part of the country: the expropriation of Polish farms and businesses, the mass confiscation and looting of private property, the deportation of more than a million young Poles to work as slaves in Germany, the brutal displacement of Polish populations, the massacres of Poles carried out by the Germans, and the confinement of the majority of Poland's 3 million Jews in overcrowded, insanitary and deadly ghettoes in the major cities in the Nazi zone, where they were dying in large numbers within a few months.

If the pact allowed Stalin to visit his murderous policies on the Baltic states, it also permitted Hitler to do the same with the much larger and more heavily populated countries he invaded in western Europe at the same time, and even more so in the areas of southern Europe he conquered early in 1941. Yet the expropriation of Jews, the mass deportation of Alsatian Jews to camps in France, the massacres and atrocities committed by the Germans and their allies in Yugoslavia and the starvation of Greece receive barely a mention in this book, although they happened while the pact was still in force. The unbalanced treatment extends even to the period after the pact ended, in June 1941: Moorhouse devotes considerable attention to the Soviet attempt to cover up the Katyn massacre, but fails to mention the deliberate killing of Red Army troops taken prisoner by the Germans.

The book ends by praising the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, instituted by the EU in 2009 at the behest of the Baltic states, and held every year on 23 August, the anniversary of the signing of the pact. It is written very much in the spirit of the founding declaration of this "Black Ribbon Day", whose 19 points focus almost exclusively on Soviet atrocities while sparing barely a thought for Nazi ones. This goes even further than merely equating the two regimes, as the declaration purports to do. In both the book and the declaration, Stalinism comes out as being far worse than nazism.

This reflects the post-communist mood in the Baltic states, where SS veterans are hailed as "freedom fighters" against the Russians and are allowed to parade unhindered through the streets of Tallinn. In this view, the war fought by the western allies against Nazi Germany was a gigantic mistake all it achieved was the enslavement of eastern Europe under the Soviet yoke. Yet, in the end, brutal and murderous though Stalinism was, Nazism visited even greater horrors on humanity with its policies of the genocidal elimination of the "inferior" and the "Jewish world enemy". The Nazi "General Plan for the East", conceived already in 1940, envisaged the extermination of 85% of the population of Estonia and 50% of the populations of Latvia and Lithuania. The Red Army might not have liberated these countries in 1945, but it certainly rescued them. Readers of this thoroughly biased and one-sided account of the Nazi-Soviet pact will have to look for these basic facts elsewhere.


30 thoughts on &ldquo Alternate Awful History &rdquo

I have read, from more than one historian, that the Germans would have had a lot more resistance from the civilian population in Russia, had Stalin and his predecessors not confiscated so many privately owned firearms. Many of the people apparently hid at least one gun and ammo, but what resistance there was, was disorganized and sporadic.

Well, it is pretty obvious that after the war Stalin wanted all of the lands conquered by the Germans.
In hind sight, anyhow, Stalin should have gotten more pushback from Roosevelt and Truman.
On the other hand, WW3 wasn’t fought, and I doubt if the American people would have supported a new war against Uncle Joe and the USSR. Certainly the Brits and the French were done.

But people need to recognize that the choice for the people of Germany in the 1930s was not “Hitler or democracy.” It was “Hitler or Stalin.”

Perhaps the argument could be flipped on its head.

Was it Hitler who saved Stalin?

Granted, Stalin was nibbling away at Europe. A little bit of Poland here, a bit of the Baltics there, maybe a taste of Finland, but he was always looking over his shoulder at his enemies at home.

Expanding into Europe meant taking on the combined forces of Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

How do you hang onto that?

Sure the local communist parties would wrap their iron claws around the levers of power like they did in Eastern Europe – but remember, the communist rode home on the tanks of liberators, not conquerors.

The other thing about Stalin’s army was, much of it ran on American equipment.

Like Uncle Joe said himself, “England gave us time, America gave us equipment, we provided the manpower.”

Like Uncle Joe said himself, “England gave us time, America gave us equipment, we provided the manpower.” Cannon fodder, not manpower.

It was US and UK that saved half of Europe. And I think Churchill would have backed US push to Moscow. People of eastern Europe can thank FDR for decades of repression and people of China for Mao terror. Who knows what would have happened if FDR supported CKS when asked. Roads not taken, millions of lives lost.

Does Russia have a deep water port available year-round in its territory? And isn’t their land mass devoid of natural barriers/defenses – other than massive distance – such as mountain ranges to slow down invaders? Russia will always look for more land, and a port, to survive.

My grandfather served on a Liberty ship, and one thing he was told that although the tires they were delivering to the Soviets clearly said “Firestone” on the side, that they were actually made in the USSR. I don’t think that, apart from U.S. aid, the Soviets would have had a path through Germany even if Schicklgruber hadn’t come to power. Their supply chain was that bad.

(they also tried to get my grandfather and his crewmates drunk to get secrets….he figured it out easily…and quite frankly, precisely what they would have learned from guys whose job was to steer a ship around U-boats and such would be debateable….they wasted their vodka and caviar, IMO)

One side note is that the early German armor for WWII was indeed tested in Russia, even before Schicklgruber, so the Soviets knew darned well that the Germans did not plan on lying down for any invasion from either the east or west.

the Germans would have had a lot more resistance from the civilian population in Russia, had Stalin and his predecessors not confiscated so many privately owned firearms

The only problem with this being that Stalin too would’ve had a lot more resistance. Years earlier. Especially in the Ukraine.

Another side note: wasn’t the primary ideological struggle between the Stalin and Trotsky factions whether to expand the revolution or build communism in one state?

Stalin was not necessarily expansionist. He would take what he easily could – but it was Trotsky who wanted to conquer the world.

NW – indeed they do have a deep-water never freezing port. On the east coast. Way east, think Vladivostok. Port of StP is also used year-round, albeit with help of icebreakers in the winter.

Since ancient times, the adage “you will never win a land war in Asia” had been proven time and time again. But I still wish Macarthur would have been allowed to march on Moscow.

“But I still wish MacArthur would have been allowed to march on Moscow.”

In the west (europe) Patton wanted to march on Moscow, I don’t ever recall MacArthur wanting to march from Seoul to Moscow ( a long slog with a daunting supply chain).

MacArthur wanted to go nuclear on China.

“Boy I wish MacArthur would have been allowed to H Bomb China”

I don’t think that, apart from U.S. aid, the Soviets would have had a path through Germany even if Schicklgruber hadn’t come to power. Their supply chain was that bad.

So much of Russia’s tactical supply chain depended on imported vehicles that, according to a few historical accounts, the Russian vernacular term for “truck” for years after the war was “Studebaker”. (I’ll defer to JPA on that one). It allowed them to focus on building less mundane, more martial stuff, like tanks.

And not even all their tanks. Among the things that they got from Lend Lease:

  • 20% of their tanks (about 2/3 American, the rest British/Canadian-built
  • The Brits built 10% of their fighter planes
  • The US built 20% of Soviet fighters and 30% of their bombers, and close to 100% of their transport planes.
  • Most of the trucks
  • Just about all the tactical radios (that were worth anything
  • A British battleship, an American light cruiser, and a fair number of smaller warships

The Soviets logistics were stretched to the breaking point in 1945, and their manpower losses had been so catastrophic they were drafting 16 year olds for front-line service.

MacA, you are absolutely correct, I got my generals mixed up.

Another point of reference is that during the Korean War, U.S. pilots initially refused to strafe and bomb North Korean supply convoys because the pilots rightly recognized them as Studebakers and Fords–though most of them were copies, courtesy of Soviet “borrowing” of not just the trucks, but also the designs.

Regarding Patton continuing and taking on the Red Army, I don’t know that we could have done it–long supply lines, etc.. But if somehow you’d succeded, imagine how many lives would have been saved from Communism–ten million or so in the USSR, another sixty million or more in China, two million in Cambodia, millions in Vietnam, etc..

Mitch, just checked with my mom. Everyone knew of Studebakers as gifts from the Americans because they were ubiquitous after the war. But no, it was not used in a vernacular. At least not in the part of the country where she grew up.

another sixty million or more in China

Russian campaign would not have saved them, but FDR support of CKS would have.

The key to understanding this is actually the Winter War itself, along with its sequel, the Continuation War.

The Winter War cost the Soviets over 1 MILLION casualties in just 105 days those stubborn Finns, who were supposed to roll over and surrender as easily as the Poles did.

[For those who don’t know, the invasion of Poland occurred on Sept. 1, 1939 around the time of the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between Hitler and Stalin. The Soviets then launched their own invasion into Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in a similar manner a few weeks later. Then the Soviets invaded the Finns on Nov. 30, 1939 expecting the same results but the Finns held them off for 105 days.]

It was only after the Soviets understood that they needed to change tactics did they gain ground against Finland’s Mannerheim Line. They changed for the entire Army, not just the divisions engaged.

Hitler thought that because the Finns, who did receive a lot of supplies from Germany via Sweden) killed so many Soviets, that the Soviets must be weak. Operation Barbarossa was designed to exploit a perceived weakness.

The Germans soon learned that the Soviets were not as weak as believed (because Soviet doctrine and tactics had changed) thereby getting the Eastern Front bogged down in a quagmire.

It truly is a fascinating part of WWII history.

#creditwhere due ^ I find that a piece of insight I hadn’t appreciated before (that the Finns gave AH a false confidence for Barbarossa). That is some butterfly effect, downstream consequences shit.

I’m a Swede, more so than anything else, and I kinda hate the Germans… have lamented that the Swedes were so cautious and duplicitous during the war… hard to fault them for letting German supplies traverse the country to go to Finland.

JPA, my thought is that if Patton had taken Moscow in 1946, Communism might have died a well-deserved death, Mao would not have taken Beijing in 1949, and hence the Cultural Revolution might never have happened. Who knows if it would have been possible, but a fascinating thought, no?

getting the Eastern Front bogged down in a quagmire

Generals Mud and Snow probably had something to with it too.

I’d have to say that the Germans did OK in year 1 having started the operation a couple of months late (to save Mussolinin’s a55 in Yugoslavia). In addition, there was the choice of encircle and capture of 800k (I think in Ukraine) or continue onward towards Moscow. They chose the former.

This is a great series on YouTube the host is taking the war week by week, and trying to avoid spoilers, to give a sense for what everyone was experiencing. Here is the excellent segment on the Winter War (which I made my daughter watch before she emigrated to Finland back in March). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2M8s3eH-gfE

Since ancient times, the adage “you will never win a land war in Asia” had been proven time and time again.
The Japanese conquered China. The Russian Empire grew by conquering other kingdoms in Asia.
The Turks conquered the Persians, and so on.
I hate cliche’s.

MO – have they been able to keep the gains? They may have won the battle but lost the war.

Night Writer, you are right, it’s one of the best series on Youtube.

By definition every country in exitence, even those in Asia, have kept the land that they have conquered. There are still Tatars in the Crimea, fer God’s sake.
Anyway, I hate cliche’s.
History is made by people ignoring common wisdom and doing what has never been done before. The princes of Muscovy started conquering their neighbors in the 17th century & the Russians still run the show over most of the continent.

Since ancient times, the adage “you will never win a land war in Asia” had been proven time and time again

It was a satirical and erroneous observation made about Vietnam, made popular by a movie in the 󈨔s.

Most every nation is Asia was created by someone, somewhere in History, winning land wars.

There are still Tatars in the Crimea, fer God’s sake.

What’s wrong with cliche’s? Just like with stereotypes, they borne of a truism.

“you will never win a land war in Asia” – Genghis Khan

Howzabout a sea war in Asia? Will the gods of cliche’s allow us to win that? Maybe we should jusr nuke the Asians from orbit? It’s the only wa to be sure.
The cliche seems to be a reflection of the failure of Western powers to conquer the Russians in 1812 and 1941-42 (no mention is made of the Russian surrender to the Germans in 1917).
I suppose that, generously considered, the cliche is a warning against invading a country while you can’t supply your army. Well, duh.
That wasn’t an issue in Vietnam, of course.
Asia is not a magical kingdom that defies invasion like Lothlorien in the Tolkian books.
I will die on this hill!

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Stalin and his lover aged 13

The story was too shocking to believe. But now that Stalin was dead, his successor Nikita Khrushchev decided he had to investigate the astonishing rumour about the monster's sexual depravity.

It was claimed that when he was in his 30s and before he became leader, Stalin had raped or seduced, even fathered a child with, a girl who was just 13 years old - and had been indicted for the under-age seduction by the police.

The tale had long been dismissed as just another piece of Western anti-Stalin propaganda.

Scroll down for more.

It had first surfaced soon after he took over from Lenin as Soviet dictator in 1924, appearing in the "scurrilous" tabloids and emigre journals in the West that were banned in the newly-formed Soviet Union.

Of course, during his reign of terror the rumour had all but disappeared - no one dared breathe a critical word about the tyrant in those years.

But on his death in 1953 it had resurfaced. And now Khrushchev, having heard the story of the under-age girl, had commissioned his KGB boss General Ivan Serov to investigate in great secrecy.

As Stalin's biographer, I had heard the story but it seemed so outrageous as to be incredible: like most historians, I simply believed that it was mere propaganda.

It did not sound like the Stalin we knew: he was married twice but usually he was portrayed, somewhat like Hitler, as a freakish inhuman monster, so unnaturally obsessed with power that he was uninterested in sex.

Yet more than 80 years on from when the rumours first appeared, I found myself examining a most extraordinary document among Stalin's papers in the so-called Presidential archives in Moscow, while researching for my new book on the young Stalin.

Marked top secret and signed by the KGB boss Serov, it was addressed to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and the Politburo.

It was dated 1956 - three years after Stalin's death - and spelt out the results of General Serov's investigation.

Serov reported back to Khrushchev that, amazingly, the entire story of Stalin's affair with a 13-year-old was true. Khrushchev showed it to the Politburo (including Stalin's long-serving henchman Molotov), who all signed it and then filed it in the deepest recesses of the archives where it has remained until now.

I was also able to find in the archives the memoirs of the girl herself, who was called Lidia. She wrote them during Stalin's reign, which is why they make no mention of any sex or the children she had by Stalin - that would have been suicidal.

Using all these and other archive documents, I constructed an astonishing picture of an unknown Stalin - one that painted him as a promiscuous and faithless serial seducer and libertine.

The picture was confirmed by the reminiscences of villagers who lived in the isolated hamlet that was the 13-year-old girl's home in Siberia.

This, then, is the true story of the under-age affair - the most shocking of many conducted during Stalin's mysterious life in the run-up to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.

In March 1914 Josef Stalin - a Georgian cobbler's son known to friends as Soso and comrades as Koba - was sentenced for his revolutionary activities by the Tsar to exile close to the Arctic Circle in a tiny hamlet named Kureika.

The place was a freezing hellhole, an isolated twilight world cut off from humanity in winter by the daylong darkness.

In Kureika, only the reindeer, snowfoxes and Tungus indigenous tribesmen could really function in deep midwinter. Everyone wore reindeer fur.

The hamlet contained 67 villagers - 38 men and 29 women - all packed into just eight ramshackle izbas or wooden peasant shacks.

Among them were seven orphans from the same family - the Pereprygins - of whom the youngest was 13-year-old Lidia.

She immediately noticed Stalin, not just because of his good looks but also because he was hopelessly underdressed with only a light coat.

Before long, he was sporting the full local outfit - from boots to hat - of reindeer fur, all of it provided by Lidia Pereprygina.

Stalin in those days was slim, attractive, charming, an accomplished poet and educated in the priesthood, but also a pitiless Marxist terrorist and brutal gangster boss - a Red Godfather who had funded Lenin's Bolsheviks with a series of audaciously bloody acts of bank robbery, piracy and racketeering.

Lidia was a schoolgirl orphan living on the remote frontier where girls matured early.

Some time in the early summer of 1914, the 35-year-old Stalin embarked on an affair with Lidia.

While not admitting to anything explicit in her memoirs, we catch a glimpse in them of Stalin and Lidia together staggering from drinking bout to drinking bout, because she writes of their drunken dancing and singsongs: "In his spare time, Stalin like to go to evening dances - he could be very jolly too. He loved to sing and dance."

These memoirs of Stalin's 13-year-old mistress - recorded 20 years later at the height of his dictatorship, while she remained a Siberian housewife - were clearly constrained.

But they contain unmistakable innuendos: "He often liked to drop in on certain people," says Lidia - by which she meant herself.

Was this how he seduced her?

Stalin was guarded during his exile by a red-bearded, red-tempered policeman named Ivan Laletin.

Stalin had already escaped many times from previous exiles. Laletin soon became his enemy.

By summer, almost everyone must have known about the sexual affair between Lidia and Stalin - she started to slip more and more regularly into his lodgings.

The policeman probably saw his chance to nail the insolent Georgian and watched Stalin carefully, determined to catch him in bed with the 13-year-old.

"One day," recalled Feodor Taraseev, the only villager who dared record the story, "Stalin was at home, working and not leaving the house.

"The policeman decided to check up on him. Without knocking on the door, he burst into the room."

Stalin was "furious to be interrupted," said Taraseev.

Almost certainly the policeman caught Stalin and Lidia in flagrante delicto.

Stalin's immediate response was to attack the policeman, who drew his sabre. Stalin was wounded in the neck, which so inflamed him that reportedly "he kicked out the rogue!"

"We witnessed this scene," says Taraseev.

"The policeman was running away towards the Yenisei River, cravenly waving his sabre in front of him while Comrade Stalin was pursuing him in a state of high excitement and fury, with his fists clenched."

At the very time that Stalin was seducing Lidia, "the lights were going out all over Europe" as Britain and the Great Powers, including Russia, careered into World War I.

His future partners in the 'Big Three' of WWII were already established and distinguished: Franklin D. Roosevelt was on his way to becoming U.S. Secretary of the Navy while Winston Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty.

Back in Siberia, the affair was no longer a secret. The statutory age of consent was 14, but it is clear from the KGB report that the sex between Stalin and Lidia was consensual.

The KGB chairman Ivan Serov explained: "J.V. Stalin started living together with her" - and this, he implied, was almost as shocking as the seduction.

Soon the news became even more jaw-dropping: Lidia was pregnant.

Stalin moved into the pitiful Pereprygin two-room shack. The lavatory was an outhouse where he used to take a rifle to scare the circling wolves.

At night, Lidia would creep into his room, recounts Stalin's first biographer Essad Bey, who must have talked to fellow exiles.

Certainly she was not shy about recalling that "he wore white underwear and a sailorstriped vest," as she confided to her interviewer in 1952, when Stalin was almost worshipped as a demi-god.

Lidia's brothers were so furious about the pregnancy that they refused to eat with Stalin. Lidia had to cook for him on his own.

According to KGB boss Serov, policeman Laletin threatened "to instigate criminal proceedings for living together with an under-age girl. J.V. Stalin promised the policeman to marry Pereprygina when she came of age".

So Stalin became engaged and the family, whether gratefully or begrudgingly, accepted the relationship.

In return, Stalin "shared his fish with them" as one of the family.

Indeed he treated Lidia almost as his young wife, entertaining at home and asking her to cook for his guests.

Stalin enjoyed the company of the shamanistic Tunguses and Ostiak tribesmen and learned to hunt and fish just like them. He still enjoyed partying, too.

"At the Taraseevs' place, the young gathered in a circle for a party - Stalin danced in the middle beating time, then he started singing," recalled a visitor to Kureika, Daria Ponamareva.

He also studied his Marxism, eagerly awaiting letters from Lenin.

Kureika, with its solitary hunting, its time to read and its young mistress, came to suit Stalin.

But all the time he knew his teenage fiancee was a transitory amusement to be abandoned by the wayside of his revolutionary mission.

The pregnancy was presumably an irritant, although locals recall Lidia was in love with Stalin.

Somewhere around December 1914, Lidia gave birth to a baby who died soon afterwards: Stalin made no comment but was definitely in Kureika at the time.

He survived the winter of 1915/16 there, too, living in a sooty, fuggy room in the Pereprygin house, and continuing the relationship.

In 1916, the Georgian lodger impregnated Lidia for the second time, and then typically made himself scarce. He escaped for the whole summer of 1916: where had he gone?

Most likely, his disappearance was connected with the pregnancy: locals claim he was devising a way to avoid marrying his pregnant mistress.

During my research, I discovered Stalin already had form as a prolific lover and that he had often promised marriage, only to renege at the last minute.

Even in these years of penniless obscurity, he was never without at least one girlfriend - and often more.

Indeed in exile, he became astonishingly promiscuous: in Vologda, in an earlier exile, he had met a saucy runaway schoolgirl of 16 named Polia who was living with a revolutionary comrade.

Stalin and she began an affair: watching secret police codenamed her Glamourpuss.

Polia was one of the few people who understood how strange Stalin was and could tease him about it: she always called him Oddball Osip - Osip being a diminutive of Josef.

When they parted, he sent her a postcard of a couple passionately embracing and wrote: "I owe you a kiss for your kiss passed onto me. Let me kiss you now! I'm not simply sending you a kiss but am kissssssssing you passionately (it's not worth kissing any other way! - Josef."

There was not much else to do in exile except drink, feud and fornicate, but Stalin had perfected all three pursuits.

He became engaged to at least three women, all of whom he abandoned. This shameless, caddish rogue seduced several landladies and usually their maids too, as well as a series of noblewomen and liberated revolutionary girls.

When he parted from one mistress, he managed to move in with another the next day, suggesting he was carrying on with several simultaneously.

His henchman Molotov recalled that, despite his pockmarks and freckles: "Women must have been enamoured by him because he was successful with them. He had honeycoloured eyes. They were beautiful."

Indeed, he later stole one of Molotov's girlfriends.

He was "attractive", Zhenya Alliluyeva, his future sister-in-law and probable mistress, recalled.

"He was a thin man, strong and energetic (with) an incredible shock of hair and shining eyes."

Everyone always mentions that he was that "man with the burning eyes".

He was mysterious, haughty, cold, watchful and foxily cunning as well as being eccentric and surprisingly intellectual. And then there was his nationality: the Georgians were the Italians of the Russian Empire, regarded as passionate and romantic.

But if the ladies expected a traditional Georgian Casanova, they must have been bitterly disappointed when they grew to know him better.

He seethed with complexes, and was shy about a stiff arm he had suffered since birth, along with his webbed toes and pockmarks.

The tender moments could not compensate for the glacial detachment and morose over-sensitivity.

Young Stalin seduced many women, but the Revolution always came first. The self-obsessed Marxist knight felt he could ride into the sunset, breaking engagements and abandoning children, whenever the Revolution called.

This is what happened to Lidia.

In October 1916, Stalin was conscripted into the Tsarist army but both he and officials must have known that his stiff arm would not pass medical examination.

Locals claim Stalin put his name on the conscription list with "a false certificate", to escape his marital obligations.

Stalin did not hang around in Kureika. He quickly said goodbye, giving one lady who had looked after him "a signed photograph and two overcoats".

Then, "seen off like a real hero", he set off. It is not known whether he said goodbye to Lidia.

After he was gone, in roughly April 1917, Lidia gave birth to a son, Alexander.

She did not tell Stalin, who never contacted her, but somehow he heard: he later told his sister-in-law Anna Alliluyeva of his Siberian son.

He was utterly unfettered by paternal feelings or even sentimental curiosity.

In February 1917, the Russian Revolution started in faraway St Petersburg. The Tsar abdicated and on March 12, Stalin arrived in the city.

In the summer of that year, he started his affair with another 16-year-old schoolgirl, Nadya Alliluyeva, who became his second wife.

When the Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917, Stalin became one of Lenin's top henchmen. Henceforth, his wild affairs in exile - especially his seduction and impregnation of a 13-year-old, his engagement to her and then abandonment - became secret.

Lidia later married a peasant fisherman, Yakov Davydov, who adopted Alexander as his own. She became a hairdresser and had eight more children.

"Stalin never helped her," reported KGB chief Serov.

Alexander was told he was Stalin's son by his mother Lidia years after her affair with Stalin, says his son, Yury.

They "kept quiet about it and only the few locals in Kureika knew whose son he really was".

Stalin's forgotten and illicit family still live in Siberia.

• YOUNG STALIN by Simon Sebag Montefiore is published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson.


Assista o vídeo: REVOLUÇÃO RUSSA 1917 (Pode 2022).